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This paper analyses English Premier League (EPL) and English Football League (EFL) 
Championship clubs during the period 2002-2019 to anticipate financial distress with specific 
reference to footballs’ Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations. 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
Data was collected for 43 professional football clubs competing in the EPL and Championship for 
the financial year ends 2002-2019. Analysis was conducted using the Z-score methodology and 
additional statistical tests were conducted to measure differences between groups. Data was split 
into two distinct periods to analyse club finances pre and post-FFP. 
Findings 
The results show significant cases of financial distress amongst clubs in both divisions and that 
Championship clubs are in significantly poorer financial health than EPL clubs. In some cases, 
financially sustainability has worsened post-FFP. The ‘big 6’ clubs - due to their size - seem to be 
more financially sound than the rest of the EPL, thus preventing a "too big to fail" effect. Overall, 
the financial situation in English football remains poor, a position that could be exacerbated by the 
economic crisis, caused by COVID-19. 
Originality 
The paper extends the evidence base of measuring financial distress in professional team sports 
and is also the first paper of its kind to examine this in relation to Championship clubs. 
Research limitations/implications 
The findings are not generalisable outside of the English football industry and the data is 
susceptible to usual accounting techniques and treatments. 
Practical implications 
The paper recommends a re-distribution of broadcasting rights, on a more equal basis and 
incentivised with cost-reduction targets. The implementation of a hard salary cap at league level 
is also recommended to control costs. Furthermore, FFP regulations should be re-visited to deliver 
the original objectives of bringing about financial sustainability in European football.  
Keywords: financial crisis, Z-score, English professional football, English Premier League, 





Financial distress in business is not a new phenomenon. However, it has become an increasingly 
important issue during the last decade since the global recession in 2008. Indeed, in 2014 the 
European Commission introduced a new policy designed to give early warning of the signs of 
financial distress in businesses that will help prevent bankruptcy (European Commission, 2014). 
Such a policy is designed to provide a quick response to the early stages of a financial crisis and 
potentially save a business before collapse. A similar scenario has occurred in European football 
over the last decade with an introduction of Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations, put forward by 
European football's governing body the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). FFP 
was implemented in European football in 2011 and was designed with two primary objectives in 
mind. First, to provide a means through which to introduce discipline and rationality to club 
finances to help safeguard the stability of European football (UEFA, 2015). Clubs were being told 
to spend within their means (hence the fundamental concept of 'break-even'). The second was a 
narrative that these regulations would enable the industry (and individual leagues) to become more 
competitively balanced (Plumley et al., 2018) although it must be noted that this was more of a 
stakeholder ideal than a hard regulation. 
 The decision behind the implementation of FFP was set against a backdrop of financial 
crisis at individual club level. In 2010, net losses among the 734 European member clubs had 
increased by 760% over the five-year period between 2006-2011 (Franck and Lang, 2013) and 
European club football had a substantial problem with servicing debt. Paradoxically, this financial 
crisis in European football coincided with a period of substantial increases in revenue (Storm and 
Nielsen, 2012). The origin of this problem was the imbalance between income and expenditure 
(mostly in the form of player wages) and, consequently, rising level of debts (Barajas and 
Rodriguez, 2013). Moreover, despite problems at club level, the leagues themselves had never 
been healthier in a financial sense, especially in the context of revenue generation. 
 
 
 Against wider economic pressures, the European football market has grown exponentially 
over the course of the last two decades (Plumley et al., 2018). A significant proportion of this 
growth is attributed to what is collectively known as the 'big five' leagues in European football, 
namely the English Premier League (England), Bundesliga (Germany), La Liga (Spain), Serie A 
(Italy) and Ligue 1 (France). At the time of writing, the English Premier League (EPL) is the 
highest revenue generating league in European football, grossing €5.85 billion in 2018/19. Spain’s 
La Liga is the second highest revenue generating league (€3.38 billion) followed by Germany 
(€3.35 billion), Italy (€2.50 billion) and France (€1.90 billion) (Deloitte, 2020). 
 In respect of FFP, there have been numerous criticisms in academic literature; for a variety 
of reasons including: the legality of FFP (e.g. Long, 2012; Peeters and Szymanski, 2014; 
Szymanski, 2014a); the impact of FFP on the quality of all teams (e.g. Drut and Raballand, 2012; 
Madden, 2012); the impact that FFP could have on player wages (negative impact) (e.g. Dietl, 
Franck and Lang, 2009; Peeters and Szymanski, 2012; Preuss et al., 2014); and the fact that FFP 
actually prevents the industry (and clubs) from benefitting from substantial injections of external 
financing (e.g. Madden, 2012; Franck, 2014). 
 Notwithstanding such comment, early evidence indicates that financial performance is 
improving, in some leagues, linked to the first objective of FFP and the break-even concept. By 
way of an example, in 2018/19 only Ligue 1 and Serie A of the ‘big five’ leagues recorded 
aggregate operating losses (Deloitte, 2020). However, whilst the financial performance of clubs in 
the top divisions in Europe may be improving, there is less empirical evidence on the situation in 
lower leagues in respective countries (those that fall outside of UEFA's FFP regulations). 
 To that end, it is pertinent to explore further the financial situation of European football 
and examine any wider financial performance issues and financial distress. The aim of this paper 
is to analyse the current financial situation in English football under the context of anticipating 
financial distress. The paper is focused on English football as it is the largest revenue generating 
 
 
league in Europe and owing to the size of the broadcasting contract (which primarily benefits EPL 
clubs) has a considerable financial gap between leagues (Wilson et al., 2018). In an attempt to 
measure the effectiveness of FFP by determining its impact on the EPL compared to the English 
Football League Championship the paper focuses on clubs that competed across the top two 
divisions in English football from 2002-2019 to cover a period both pre and post-FFP.  
Finally, in the light of the current economic crisis (caused by the COVID-19 global pandemic), it 
is relevant to draw a comparison with the great recession of 2008/2009 and consider whether the 
too big to fail effect can be expected (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013; Mishkin, 2006). In the 
case of professional football federations, the big clubs, even in danger of bankruptcy, would be 
guaranteed to be saved by public funds. The study of the excessive risk-taking behaviour of big 
clubs can be explained by softer budgetary constraints (Storm and Nielsen, 2012) and by the 
observation of the "too big to fail" effect incentives. These risk incentives may also explain the 
reason for the implementation of FFP regulations (Franck, 2014). Therefore, in this paper, the 
determination of whether FFP has had a mitigating effect on the risk-taking behaviour of the big 
clubs, as measured by their financial strength, is crucial to assess its effectiveness and to prevent 
more public spending. 
 The rest of the paper is structured into the remaining sections. Next, the theoretical 
background of anticipating financial distress is discussed followed by some additional context on 
the English professional football industry. The paper then details the methods and analysis 
undertaken. Following this, the paper presents the empirical evidence before discussing the 
implications and providing some concluding thoughts and recommendations for future research 
direction. 
Anticipating financial distress 
 
 
Throughout the course of the last sixty years, there have been several models that have been 
developed that have sought to predict bankruptcy in companies. As time has progressed, these 
models have ranged from univariate to multi-variate methods and increasing degrees of 
complexity. One of the first models was proposed by Beaver (1966) who analysed various financial 
ratios of companies five years before the bankruptcy occurred, and then compared them with the 
ratios of solvent companies. Within this model, he was trying to isolate several factors that could 
differentiate between various samples of firms that had gone bankrupt and others that had not. 
Financial ratio analysis is still considered one of the principal ways to measure financial 
performance in a company. It has been used extensively in academic articles across a variety of 
sectors and industries including the airline industry (Feng and Wang, 2000), the American 
power/energy industry (Sueyoshi, 2005), the Slovenian manufacturing industry (Ponikvar, 
Tajnikar and Pusnik, 2009) and the European football industry (Dimitropoulos, 2010; Plumley et 
al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2013).  
 However, with reference to Beaver's original model, financial distress and economic failure 
in companies is very complex and often a function of several different factors. To that end, other 
models that have since been developed have attempted to evaluate financial distress by using 
multi-discriminant analysis to analyse the assessment of business entities as going concerns (see 
for example Altman, 1968; Altman and McGough, 1974; Deakin, 1972; Koh and Killough, 1990; 
Mutchler, 1985; Ohlson, 1980; Zmijewski, 1984; Martens et al., 2008) and more recently data 
mining techniques (applying neural networks and decision tree analysis) to predict going concern 
(see for example Koh and Low, 2004; Martens et al., 2008). These models attempt to examine and 
quantify the variables that predict whether a company has the risk of falling into financial 
difficulty. 
 Additionally, there has been further debate around the importance of non-financial based 
analysis in classifying a company at risk of failure (Fadhil Abidali and Harris, 1995) and in the 
 
 
importance of sporting performance variables for professional sport teams (Plumley et al., 2017). 
Conceptually, this approach is based on the belief that if a company is in financial difficulty the 
reason generally relates to inadequate management ability and errors perpetrated earlier. The 
outcome was the designing of an A-score which is used to address this aspect of failure prediction. 
This A-score is used against the Z-score for comparative purposes (Fadhil Abidali and Harris, 
1995). The non-financial measures raised in this paper are highly qualitative and difficult to 
measure, as previous authors have also discovered (see Romero Castro and Pineiro Chousa, 2006). 
However, this does not mean that qualitative information should be ignored, rather that the author 
must find a way of justifying their inclusion based on sound methodological principles. Qualitative 
data can provide richer information to offer new insights for researchers in this regard. Fadhil 
Abidali and Harris (1995) address this by assigning weighting measures that calibrated the results 
of a questionnaire that was distributed to management level employees in companies in the 
construction industry to ascertain their views on the most important factors. Interviews could also 
have been conducted with the directors of the companies following a similar process. 
 Ittner et al. (2003) also consider this issue in detail. Again, the context in which the study 
is set, focusing on bonus payments to employees and the use of subjective quantitative and non-
quantitative factors in determining this, is less relevant although the general discussion around 
weighting performance measures offers some interesting insights. Firstly, Ittner et al. (2003) note 
that the potential difficulties with 'weighting' factors include determining the appropriate weights 
to place on each measure. Attempting to analyse this further the paper considers the balanced 
scorecard approach put forward by Kaplan and Norton (1996). Since improved financial results 
are the goal of balanced scorecard systems, outcome-effect studies also suggest that financial 
results will be weighted more heavily than non-financial results. In relation to the paper by Ittner 
et al. (2003) and the literature that the paper covers, the authors provide no theoretical explanation 
in the way in which they have weighted certain factors higher than others. This could be partly 
 
 
because studies into direct experiments on the use of financial and non-financial measures on 
employee performance are inconclusive (Ittner et al., 2003). In the field of organisational 
psychology, the literature has long held the argument that greater weight should be placed on 
performance measures that are more reliable. According to this literature, subjective, qualitative 
performance assessments are often less accurate and reliable than more objective, quantitative 
measures (Ittner et al., 2003). 
 In view of the extant literature, this paper will utilise a recognised model of predicting 
financial distress devised by Altman (1968, 2000) and Altman et al. (1977) which is the Z-score 
and Z-models. The rationale behind using this model is that is one of the most used and has the 
advantage of simplicity (Barajas and Rodriguez, 2013). Furthermore, it has been used persistently 
by researchers, practitioners, banks and rating agencies in finance and accounting research 
(Cantoni, 2004; Charitou, 2004; Grice and Ingram, 2001). More recent literature cites Altman's 
model as one of the most effective multi-discriminant analysis models for the past 40 years 
(Anjum, 2012) and Pitrova (2012) maintains that the model ranks the group of healthy companies 
well and accurately detects the financial issues of companies one year prior to bankruptcy.  
 For these reasons above, this paper will utilise Altman's model to analyse the financial 
situation of English professional football clubs. A more detailed explanation of the financial ratios 
is provided by Altman (2000) but the model itself is outlined below. The first model, Altman's Z-
score, is computed as follows: 
Z=0.012X1+0.014X2+0.033X3+0.006X4+0.999X5 where: 
X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets 
X2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
X3 = EBIT/Total Assets 
X4 = Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities 
 
 
X5 = Sales/Total Assets 
Z= Z-score 
Altman found that for a Z-score value: 
● over 3, the business is free of bankruptcy risk; 
● between 2.7 and 3, a monitoring process is recommended; 
● between 1.8 and 2.7, a detailed analysis of financial problems is recommended; 
● below 1.8, bankruptcy risk is high. 
However, this initial model is only applicable to public companies since X4 is estimated from 
market values. For this reason, Altman modified the model to make it suitable for analysing private 
companies. The new model was therefore as follows: 
Z1=0.717X1+0.847X2+3.107X3+0.420X4+0.998X5 where: 
X4 = Book Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities 
 In this model, the book value of equity is the difference between total assets and total 
liabilities. There is also a third version of the model that is more appropriate for non-manufacturing 
companies. In the third model, the X5 ratio (sales/total assets) is excluded. This was done to 
minimise the potential effect related to the specific manufacturing industry because this industry 
is highly sensitive to the criteria of the size of the business. The third version of the model is as 
follows: 
Z2=6.56X1+3.26X2+6.72X3+1.05X4 where: 
X4 = Book Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities 
X5 is excluded. 
 In relation to the models above, this paper has chosen to conduct the analysis using Z1 and 
Z2 for the following reasons. The original Z-score is only applicable to public companies. The 
 
 
football clubs included in this paper are all private companies. Furthermore, there is significant 
subjectivity involved when attempting to determine the market value of a football club when 
considering factors that would not be covered in club accounts relating to goodwill values such as 
club history, heritage and strength of fan base.  
It is acknowledged that there is also some subjectivity in the use of total asset valuation for 
football clubs owing to how player valuation in annual accounts work. A football player is recorded 
as an intangible asset in the accounts and their value each year is calculated by taking the transfer 
fee and dividing by the number of years of the contract to provide an annual amortisation charge 
against the player which generates a current net book value for the player (for example, a player 
signed for £50m on a 5-year contract would have an annual amortisation charge of £10m per year). 
However, the total book value of all assets of a football club (in the accounts) is likely to be 
undervalued owing to the value of ‘homegrown’ academy players and Bosman players being 
excluded from having any value in the accounts. A good example to illustrate this is Lionel Messi 
of Barcelona. Messi came through Barcelona’s youth system and as such will have never had an 
accounting ‘value’ in Barcelona’s annual reports even though he would command a significant 
transfer fee in the current market. Notwithstanding this, there are no bulletproof alternatives when 
attempting to find player valuations in an external football transfer market. Statistic websites such 
as Transfermarkt house player valuations based on performance metrics, but a club would always 
look to inflate any values slightly when selling a player to drive up the price. As such, the authors 
argue that the variables used in the Z-score formula are still robust enough to use from an 
accounting perspective to measure the assets of a club. The variables used here are also comparable 
with industry publications that analyse club finances such as the Deloitte Annual Review of 
Football Finance.  
 
 
Additionally, the Z2 model is suitable to an industry where there are no listed companies and where 
the size of companies varies significantly. For these reasons, the Z1 and Z2 models appear to 
constitute an appropriate framework of analysis for the professional football industry in England.  
Finally, the examination of correlation between the Z21 scores of EPL clubs and their relative size 
as measured by their revenues will allow this paper to highlight a reduction in the “too big to fail” 
effect for the “big 6” EPL clubs.  
The financial situation in English professional football 
 During the last thirty years the domestic landscape of football in England has altered 
considerably. In 1991/92 the collective revenue of the 92 Football League clubs was £263m, with 
the average club in the old Football League Division One generating less than £8m. In 2011/12 
the 92 Premier and Football League clubs combined revenues exceeded £4.5 billion, with average 
Premier League club revenues having risen to £228m, nearly 30 times their level 30 years 
previously (Deloitte, 2018). 
 This remarkable rate of growth reflects the game's omnipresent domestic and global profile 
with the exposure and interest having relentlessly driven revenues. There is little doubt that the 
league (the EPL) is an incredible success in revenue terms and this success has continued in recent 
years through one of the most challenging economic environments in decades as the economy 
continues to struggle to regain ground lost during the 2008/09 recession. The directors of the 
Premier League are happy with the present state of the business model given that broadcasting 
rights have been sold up until the 2021/22 season although there is a note of caution in the accounts 
relating to risk areas such as the credit risk of broadcasters, fluctuation of foreign exchange rates 
and illegal broadcasting of Premier League games. Notwithstanding this, football, at the top end, 
 
1 Since the calculation of Z2 excludes the value of sales (X5), its selection rather than Z1 avoids a collinearity 




continues to thrive with capacity utilisation at EPL games standing at 95% (Deloitte, 2018). One 
of the main factors in this remarkable rise in revenue terms has been the broadcasting deals 
negotiated by the EPL, on behalf of its member clubs since the inception of the new venture in 
1992. 
 Morrow (2003) proposed that football's relationship with TV is a paradox. On the one hand, 
television has been responsible for substantially increasing the revenues available in the game. At 
the same time it is those very revenues, or rather the manner in which they are shared out, that has 
most undermined competitive league balance and has led to the emergence of financially dominant 
leagues and financially dominant super clubs. For example, in English football, the average EPL 
team earns a minimum of £100m from the latest TV deal that has just ended (2016-2019). The 
EPL distributes some of this money down to the EFL but the financial difference is vast. Each 
Championship club receives roughly £6.5m from the same deal, meaning that the absolute 
financial gap between clubs in these two leagues is roughly £93.5m before a ball has even been 
kicked in the season. Noll (2007) offers a similar argument, stating that television has vastly 
increased the revenues of the most popular sports and that most likely, increased television 
exposure has spurred growth in live attendance at matches and other sources of revenue as well 
(see Allan, 2004; Baimbridge et al., 1995, 1996; Forrest et al., 2004; Forrest et al.,  2005; Forrest 
and Simmons, 2006; Garcia and Rodriguez, 2002; Kuypers, 1996). 
 Major football broadcasting rights contracts have escalated substantially in recent years in 
English football. The first television contract signed in 1983 for just £5.2m (Gratton and Taylor, 
2000) seems remarkably nondescript in relation to the more recent deals. In the years 2001-2004 
domestic TV rights in the EPL were worth £450m which by the end of the 2007-2009 deal had 
escalated to £1.7 billion. Despite commentators stating that it would be dangerous to assume that 
such increases could continue unabated (Beech, 2010) the value rose again in 2012 to £3 billion 
only for the record to be broken once again with a new deal in place for 2016-2019 worth £5.1 
 
 
billion in UK rights alone which equated to a 70% increase on the previous deal (Swiss Ramble, 
2015). The most recent deal signed (2019-2022) has seen a slight dip in the UK rights (£4.4bn) but 
the overseas pot is expected to grow so the overall total may once again beat the previous record. 
The continual increase in broadcasting rights appears to have expanded the gap between the EPL 
and the rest of the football leagues in the UK, particularly because clubs receive parachute 
payments (a financial payment from the league that attempts to soften the blow of relegation) if 
they are relegated from the EPL. 
 However, despite all the positive signs, there have been financial issues at individual club 
level, specifically relating to cost control linked to player wages. Revenue growth has been 
accompanied by corresponding increases in costs, particularly in player wages. The control of 
players' wages, to deliver robust and sustainable businesses, remains football's greatest commercial 
challenge and in recent years there has been an increasing trend for any additional revenue 
generated to disappear as additional costs. Indeed, the average wages to turnover in the Football 
League Championship (tier 2) is currently 107% for the 2018/19 figures (Deloitte, 2020) indicating 
that many clubs are spending more on player wages than they earn in revenue. Furthermore, there 
is a clear financial disparity between the EPL and the rest of the Football League (EFL). The 
average revenue of Championship (tier 2) clubs in 2018/19 was £57m (clubs with parachute 
payments) and £23m (clubs without parachute payment) (Deloitte, 2020). These clubs are also the 
ones pushing hardest to achieve promotion to the EPL and are the ones most at risk from 
overstretching themselves financially as a result. The financial gap to League 1 and League 2 (tiers 
3 and 4) is considerably wider. Average revenue for clubs in these leagues was £8m and £4m 
respectively in 2018/19 (Deloitte, 2020). Consequently, it can also be argued that FFP is not having 
the desired impact outside of the elite clubs (that qualify for UEFA competitions) in English 
football. In fact, it is plausible that the overall financial health of clubs could be worse now than 
before FFP as some clubs may risk financial stability in an attempt to bridge the gap to the elite 
 
 
clubs whilst under the constraints of FFP that limit owner injection and external financing (e.g. 
Madden, 2012; Franck, 2014) and impact the quality of all teams (e.g. Drut and Raballand, 2012; 
Madden, 2012). We explore this possibility as part of our analysis in this paper.  
 A more pertinent issue at governance level recently has been the threat of break-away 
leagues at both EPL and EFL level. The EFL Championship clubs feel aggrieved at the most recent 
broadcast deal signed for their leagues which totals around £595m over five years, considerably 
less than the most recent EPL deal. Consequently, some owners of Championship clubs have 
threatened to form a break-away league dubbed 'EPL 2' in an attempt to extract more money from 
broadcasters which they believe are willing to pay far more than the current deal to show 
Championship football matches to a wider global audience (Fisher and James, 2018). 
 Against this backdrop, this paper analyses the financial situation at current EPL and 
Championship clubs in respect of financial distress. The research has three main aims. First, to 
examine whether clubs in the EPL and Championship are in financial distress. Second, to examine 
the financial gap between the EPL and Championship clubs in relation to financial distress. Third, 
to attempt to test the efficacy of FFP regulations by considering financial distress before and after 
its implementation.  
The paper also presents five hypotheses that will be tested as part of the study: 
H1: EPL clubs will not be in a position of financial distress 
H2: EFL Championship clubs will be in a position of financial distress 
H3: There will be a significant difference between the EFL Championship clubs and the EPL clubs 
in respect of financial distress. 
H4: There will be a significant difference between financial distress scores pre- and post-FFP 
regulations for all clubs 
H5: The FFP regulations did not have a positive impact on financial soundness of EPL clubs 
 
 
H6: The ‘big 6’ EPL clubs exhibit increasing “too big to fail” incentives to risk-taking 
 
Methods 
Data was collected for 43 professional football clubs competing in the EPL and Championship for 
the financial year ends 2002-2019. To qualify for the study a club must have spent a minimum of 
9 years (seasons) (50% of the total time) competing in either league. This period was chosen as it 
provides two distinct time periods both pre- and post-FFP (2002-2010 and 2011-2019). Data was 
collected from the annual reports of the clubs and Z1 and Z2 scores were calculated using this data 
against the method outlined by Altman's Z-score models detailed earlier in the paper. The data was 
split into 21 EPL and 22 EFL Championship clubs. This was done in relation to the total number 
of years (seasons) that the clubs had spent in those respective leagues linked to the period of the 
study. For example, each club had eighteen years' worth of financial data available and if a club 
had spent nine or more years in one league during the period then they were assigned to that league. 
This is because their financial performance would have been affected by divisional status 
particularly in relation to broadcasting income. Table 1 outlines the clubs analysed for this study 
and the leagues in which they were placed for analysis purposes. 
<Table 1 about here> 
 Full figures have been collected for all clubs except for some exceptional circumstances 
where data wasn’t available due to clubs being in administration and/or not filing accounts on time 
(e.g. Bolton Wanderers for 2018 and 2019, Crystal Palace for 2009 and 2010, Derby County for 
2019, Ipswich Town for 2019, Leeds United for 2007, Leicester City for 2002 and 2003, 
Middlesbrough for 2010, Sheffield Wednesday for 2019 and Sunderland for 2019). Analysis was 
conducted using the Z-score methodology to produce Z1 and Z2 scores for each club. Additional 
 
 
statistical tests were conducted including independent sample t-tests to measure differences 
between groups. 
Results 
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive data from the analysis. These tables show the seasonal 
averages for the EPL and Championship respectively for all variables included in the dataset. There 
is a significant financial gap between the EPL and the Championship in absolute terms. Average 
revenue has increased from £46.1m in 2002 to £220.8m in 2019 whilst average revenue in the 
Championship has increased from £15.3m to £70.9m for the same period. This financial gap is 
primarily due to the broadcasting deals and the value of distribution payments to clubs in the EPL 
versus Championship. A further alarming figure in respect of financial management is that average 
wage costs in the Championship are very close to average revenue figures which mean that these 
clubs are spending a significantly high proportion of their revenue on player wages. This over-
investment in player wages is symptomatic of the strategic approach taken by some Championship 
clubs that are attempting to reach the EPL and the riches on offer from the EPL broadcasting fees. 
When considering the impact of FFP on club finances, a similar trend is found. Average EPL 
revenue from 2002-2010 was around £70m and this figure has increased to £153.8m for the period 
2011-2019. In the Championship, average revenue was £16.3m pre-FFP and has increased to 
£39.8m post-FFP.  
 Additionally, it is worth noting the Working Capital is negative for several clubs and this 
occurs more in the Championship. When the working capital is negative, Altman's X1 ratio is 
negative as well (Barajas and Rodriguez, 2013). Indeed, regarding the X1 scores, only 9.5% (2/21) 
of the EPL clubs returned a positive X1 score and only 9.1% (2/22) of Championship clubs 
returned a positive X1 score. This means that a significant number of clubs are experiencing 
serious financial problems because they cannot cover their debt related payments in the short term 
(Barajas and Rodriguez, 2013).  
 
 
 The same comparisons can be made in respect of shareholders' equity. In the EPL, the 
average figures are positive, but the figure is negative for all seasons for Championship clubs. In 
fact, 16 out of the 22 Championship clubs in the study returned negative equity scores on average. 
This in turn implies that all Championship clubs should issue shares or raise funds from the 
members/owners, yet this is restricted to some extent under FFP regulations. This is also reflected 
in the X2 scores that outline Retained Earnings. Average retained earnings were positive for 7/21 
(33.3%) and 5/22 (22.7%) for EPL and Championship clubs, respectively.  
<Table 2 about here> 
<Table 3 about here> 
 With reference to the overall Z-scores for all clubs analysed, the picture is austere. Table 4 
presents the descriptive statistics, and Tables 5 and 6 show the average results for all clubs for the 
EPL and Championship, respectively. 
<Table 4 about here> 
<Table 5 about here> 
<Table 6 about here> 
Analysis shows that there are a significant number of clubs at risk of bankruptcy based on 
Altman's Z1 and Z2 scores. Based on the descriptive statistics this appears to be more of a problem 
for Championship clubs but only due to the slightly higher number of observations. Indeed, there 
are still many EPL clubs that are at high risk despite these clubs having access to the increased 
broadcasting rights payments compared to their Championship counterparts. These clubs are 
mostly those situated in the bottom half of the table that have smaller resources than the bigger 
clubs in the league or clubs that have tended to ‘yo-yo’ between the EPL and Championship (e.g. 
Norwich, West Bromwich Albion). Of further significance, focusing on the clubs that returned low 
or no business risk, they are already the established elite (e.g. Arsenal, Manchester United, 
 
 
Tottenham Hotspur). With this in mind, and in relation to FFP regulations, how can other clubs 
begin to close the gap to these clubs given that they are high risk of bankruptcy themselves? This 
has certainly been a bone of contention in the academic literature linked to critiques of FFP in 
recent years (e.g. Madden 2012; Franck, 2014) and the analysis in this paper appears to support 
such a rhetoric that FFP has actually created a metaphorical ‘glass ceiling’ for clubs outside the 
elite five or six clubs in the top domestic leagues. Additionally, we offer some descriptive insight 
into the European wide picture here to provide further context. Table 7 states the collective 
profitability of clubs in the ‘Big Five’ leagues in Europe since 2009/10. This shows that the clubs 
in England, Spain and Germany have been collectively generating profit since the inception of 
FFP. However, this is not the case for clubs in Italy and France. Indeed, French clubs have reported 
aggregate operating losses for the last 12 seasons (Deloitte, 2020). Despite both these leagues 
seeing revenue growth, they have both reported significant increases in wage spending leading to 
collective losses. However, to bridge the gap and break the metaphorical ‘glass ceiling’ created by 
FFP, spending is seen as the only way to compete for many clubs even if this puts them at financial 
risk. With regards to the hypotheses presented, descriptively at least, H1 should be rejected and 
H2 should be accepted.  
<Table 7 about here> 
 Further statistical tests were conducted to attempt to highlight the difference between the 
Z1 and Z2 scores for the EPL and Championship clubs. An independent samples T-test for both 
the Z1 and Z2 scores was significant at the 0.01 level for both Z1 (t(760) = 4.428, P < .01) and Z2 
scores (t(760) = 4.202, P < .01). In respect of the direction of the mean scores, this outlines that 
the Championship clubs are significantly worse with reference to financial health as measured by 
Altman's Z1 and Z2 scores. Thus, H3 should be accepted. 
When considering the impact of FFP, there were no significant differences in scores in the 
EPL but an independent samples T-test was significant at the 0.05 level for both Z1 (t(386) = 
 
 
2.044, P < .05) and Z2 (t(386) = 2.129, P < .05) scores in the Championship. Again, the direction 
of the mean scores here point to significantly worse financial health for Championship clubs post 
the introduction of FFP which is interesting given that FFP was designed to improve financial 
sustainability. It is acknowledged that the EFL apply their own version of FFP which is different 
to UEFA’s, but it still does not appear to be leading to financial sustainability for clubs that 
compete in this league. As a result, H4 is partially accepted. Not all clubs showed a significant 
difference in financial distress scores pre and post-FFP but those primarily competing in the 
Championship did.  
We now refine the analysis to the larger clubs of the EPL. Tables 8,9 show the comparison between 
the big 6 clubs and the rest of the clubs in the study and tests the assumption made in H5. As noted 
previously, only Z2 scores are considered here to avoid collinearity with revenue variables. It can 
be observed that the Z2 scores have improved over time – since the inception of the FFP 
regulations – but that differences exist between the big 6 clubs and the rest of the EPL. Indeed, the 
former has seen their Z2 scores reach levels consistent with financial soundness after the 
implementation of the FFP (M1= -0.53, M2= 1.49; V1=0.20, V2=3.09) with a difference 
significant at the 0.01 level as measured by a t-test (t(16)=3.347, p<0.01). On average, for the rest 
of the league, Z2 scores remain negative (M1=--7.76, M2=5.70; V1=1.16, V2=4.37) while the 
differences between periods is not significant. Therefore, H5 can be rejected for the big 6 clubs 
which have seen an increase in their financial soundness (independent of their relative size/revenue 
as measured by Z2) while H5 cannot be rejected for the rest of the EPL. 
<Tables 8,9 about here> 
Regarding the “too big to fail” effect, it appears that the correlation between size (as measured 
with revenues) and Z2 score is moderate to strong for the big 6 clubs over the entire period, which 
rejects the observation of this effect. However, this correlation is weak for the rest of the league 
and the difference between the two samples (M1=0.54, M2=0.14) is significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
as measured by a t-test (t(34)=4.08, p<0.01). Although the correlation between size and financial 
soundness has increased post FFP (Pre 2011: M1=0.47, M2=0.04; t(16)=2.88, p<0.01; Post 2011: 
M1: 0.62; M2: 0.24t(16)=3.04, p<0.01) for the big 6 and the rest of the league, the difference 
between periods is not significant. 
With reference to the hypotheses of this study, H1 and H6 must be rejected and H2 and H3 are 
accepted. H4 is partially accepted. Despite clubs in the EPL having record levels of turnover, there 
are still significant cases of possible financial distress. This is magnified in respect of 
Championship clubs and there is a significant difference between the levels of financial distress in 
the Championship versus the EPL. Furthermore, since the introduction of FFP, financial distress 
scores have worsened for clubs in the Championship compared to the EPL. Finally, H5 can be 
rejected for the ‘big 6’ clubs which have improved their financial soundness post-FFP thus 
demonstrating a positive effect of the regulation on the one hand. On the other hand, H5 cannot be 
rejected for the rest of the EPL league thus demonstrating differences in the impact of the 
regulation on the financial soundness of clubs.  
Discussion 
The findings of this paper point towards financial instability for most clubs in the EPL and the 
EFL. In this regard, the findings are in line with previous work directly related to anticipating 
financial distress in Spanish football (e.g. Barajas and Rodriguez, 2013). However, Barajas and 
Rodriguez found that the phenomenon in Spain was worse in La Liga (tier 1) than in Liga Adelante 
(tier 2). This paper finds the opposite in the sense that the phenomenon of financial distress in 
English football was worse in the Championship (tier 2) than in the EPL (tier 1). Furthermore, the 
findings echo previous research that has analysed insolvency events in English (e.g. Szymanski, 
2014b) and French (e.g Scelles et al., 2018) football, respectively. Whilst overspending and 
financial mismanagement in European professional football is not necessarily a new phenomenon, 
it should outline cause for concern with regards to the regulations set by UEFA and individual 
 
 
league organisers to ensure financial sustainability. This is specifically aimed at FFP regulations 
implemented at local level and the inconsistencies between these and UEFA directive. The EPL 
has its own version of FFP, of course, but all clubs state that they aim to conform with UEFA’s 
directive should they qualify for European competition. The dataset analysed for this study also 
considers two distinct time periods both pre and post-FFP regulations. Whilst there have been 
positive signs in the UEFA benchmarking report in respect of break-even and profit, there remains 
significant financial problems at club level in the EPL, and the Championship when considering 
broader financial health and anticipating financial distress. In relation to Altman's Z-score, many 
English football clubs are at risk financially, despite some of them competing in a league where 
the revenues on offer have never been higher. 
Additionally, the situation in the Championship has actually become worse in the post-FFP 
time period and whilst this is not the case in the EPL there does appear to be a scenario in this 
league where the “big 6” remain dominant and the surrounding factors of FFP and poor financial 
performance are making it difficult for other clubs to break into the higher league positions. This 
supports the point of Madden (2012) and Franck (2014) who state that FFP limits owner 
investment and progression on the pitch in some instances and also the findings of Plumley et al. 
(2018) who stated that post-FFP various European leagues have been dominated by a select 
number of clubs. 
 A further important consideration, subsequently, is how are these clubs surviving 
financially if the reporting figures suggest that they are at risk? It appears some are largely reliant 
on owner injections (in a variety of formats) to manage levels of debt and equity. Though the focus 
may have shifted towards foreign ownership of English football clubs in recent years (e.g. Wilson 
et al., 2013), it appears as though these owners are still taking on the role of major benefactors 




 Of greater concern is the austere financial picture in the Championship. In this league, there 
is clear evidence of clubs risking financial stability to get promoted to the EPL. They must also 
contend with a more stringent version of FFP - devised by the EFL themselves. This means that if 
they miss out on promotion to the EPL within a three-year period then they are effectively playing 
Russian roulette with their finances for the following three years with the potential overspend 
incurred putting them at risk of breaking the financial regulations of the EFL. This is further 
complicated by the fact that the clubs coming down from the EPL are receiving substantial 
parachute payments (c.£90m over three years) which is designed to help soften the blow of 
relegation.  
 Even though revenues in the English game have never been higher, the situation 
considering overall financial health measured against the Z-scores is perhaps not surprising. It is 
widely accepted that the majority of a clubs' income is subsequently spent on player wages as clubs 
battle with the twin objectives present in professional sport and trying to balance financial and 
sporting success (see for example, Carlsson-Wall et al., 2016; Plumley et al., 2017). 
Notwithstanding this fact, there is also a clear argument that clubs should be looking at a longer 
term plan to financial sustainability, one which doesn't over-rely on broadcasting contracts which 
may not always be so lucrative and are effectively a stream of 'unearned' income. This is even 
more pertinent for Championship clubs who do not have access to the broadcasting money that 
EPL clubs do which already puts them at a distinct financial disadvantage in that league. 
 
Can the EPL and the EFL Do More?  
Previous research into Z-scores in Spanish football (Barajas and Rodriguez, 2013) called on 
Spanish football to cut expenses and inject capital to solve problems relating to financial distress. 
The recommendations of this paper call for a redistribution of EPL broadcasting money to make 
 
 
the payments more equitable not just in the EPL but across the football league in England as a 
whole. Whilst the EPL broadcasting distribution model remains relatively equal between its 
member clubs, it is not equitable across the wider football league structure. Indeed, the guaranteed 
income from broadcasting for the club that finishes bottom of the EPL (for the most recent contract 
2016-2019) is c.£100m. Each club in the Championship is only guaranteed c.£5-6m. Here, the 
financial gap between the two leagues is laid bare and it is easy to see why Championship clubs 
are over-stretching themselves financially to reach the EPL. Much like Wilson et al. (2018) called 
for a redistribution of broadcasting revenues across the league system in their paper on the impact 
of parachute payments on competitive balance in the Championship, this paper calls for the same 
action, in order to redress the financial balance between the EPL and the Championship. This may 
also go some way to curbing the over investment in players and the perceived 'rat race' culture 
present in European football (e.g. Bachmaier et al., 2018) and bring about more competitive 
balance which has been declining across Europe and in English football over the last twenty years 
(e.g. Ramchandani et al., 2018; Plumley et al., 2017).  
 The on-going issue here, however, is the continuing power struggle between the EPL and 
the EFL as previously cited by Wilson et al. (2018). Both the EPL and EFL are competition 
organisers under the wider jurisdiction of The Football Association (FA) which is the main 
governing body of the sport in the UK. However, both the EPL and EFL have been allowed, over 
time, to implement their own rulebooks and regulations that participants must adhere too. 
Furthermore, certain rules and regulations are not consistent which means that the clubs are not 
playing on a level playing field in terms of off-pitch performance. This in turn creates a power 
struggle because the EPL has essentially created a self-regulating league through the collective 
selling of its own broadcasting rights and commercial deals which has also led to self-sustaining 
powerful 'super clubs' that monopolise the market to some extent. Under this current structure, and 
under current regulations such as FFP, it is difficult to imagine a point at which the financial 
 
 
balance between clubs would begin to be redressed and levels of financial distress would abate 
somewhat.   
 The COVID-19 pandemic must also serve as a call to action for football and its clubs to 
consider a financial reset for the benefit of the game. The EFL has attempted to support its clubs 
during this pandemic, committing a further £50m in solidarity payments to all clubs in the system 
to run daily operations (English Football League, 2020). However, there have been recent calls for 
member clubs in both leagues to recognise the value they create collectively or risk failure (Wilson 
et al., 2020). It is widely acknowledged that professional football clubs act as economic partners 
to deliver the product to its audience (see Bond et al., 2019). In short, the clubs need each other to 
survive both on and off the pitch. 
As part of a financial reset in football, broadcasting and solidarity payments could be 
shared more equally to boost revenues throughout the leagues and more equitable cost control 
measures such as salary caps should be implemented in all leagues. In this regard, a salary cap 
could replace the current version of FFP as it would naturally serve as a form of cost control. It is 
not just about sharing wealth nor purely controlling costs and balancing the books. It is a 
combination of these factors that will drive the collective value of football clubs and help to 
maintain competitive balance within league structures. As Wilson et al. (2020) note, now is not 
the time for clubs and leagues to act in self-interest. Instead, it is a time to engage with evidence 
and for collective action. In addition, cost reduction targets - incentivised with broadcasting rights 
redistribution - could be implemented to improve financial stability at all levels and especially for 
the rest of the EPL and EFL clubs which are more at risk of bankruptcy. In this paper, we have 
shown that the financial gap between leagues and certain clubs within leagues is growing. 
Furthermore, most clubs in the EPL and Championship are at high risk of financial distress. The 
leagues need to work together on these issues through sharing wealth collectively and identifying 
relevant cost control measures such as salary caps to promote financial sustainability across the 
 
 
industry as a whole at a time where revenue from matchday income (the main source of revenue 
for a large number of clubs) is scarce.  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this paper presents two main findings. First, the descriptive analysis of 
English clubs' finances (for both EPL and Championship clubs) as measured by Altman's Z-score 
presents evidence of poor financial health and the potential for financial distress to occur. This is 
despite the introduction of FFP regulations that were designed, in part, to bring about financial 
sustainability at club level. Second, in relation to comparative performance, there was a significant 
difference between Championship and EPL clubs based on the Z-scores with Championship 
returning poorer scores and being more at risk of financial distress in a league where the 
opportunity to increase revenues through lucrative broadcasting deals is not available. These 
findings not only extend the evidence base of measuring financial distress in professional team 
sports but also contribute to the academic literature in a novel way, primarily by being the first 
paper of its kind to examine Z-scores in relation to Championship clubs in England. 
 Consequently, the paper provides three main recommendations that could be implemented 
at policy level to potentially safeguard the long-term viability of the league structure in English 
professional football and to potentially alleviate the financial distress occurring at individual club 
level. First, a re-distribution of broadcasting revenue is recommended to bridge the financial gap 
between the leagues. Solidarity payments paid to Championship clubs are dwarfed by parachute 
payments and by the central broadcasting money to EPL clubs which creates an immediate 
financial disparity between the EPL and Football League. A more equal distribution and 
conditional to cost-reduction targets, of the broadcasting rights, suggested by Noll (2007) in 
relation to improving competitive balance of leagues, would possibly begin to bridge the financial 
 
 
gap between some clubs and in some cases reduce the tendency to gamble thus reducing volatility 
and risk in financial performance.  
 Second, a fixed salary cap should be imposed at league level set at an actual value rather 
than a percentage of turnover. This would help clubs to keep costs under control to some extent 
and promote financial sustainability in the long-term. Football Leagues 1 and 2 in England have 
already implemented this for the start of the 2020/21 season but the evidence provided in this paper 
suggests it is needed in the EPL and Championship also.  
 Third, in relation to recommendations one and two above, it would be advisable for UEFA, 
the EPL and the EFL to revisit the FFP regulations that were designed to bring about financial 
sustainability. Whilst there have been positive instances of more clubs conforming to the break-
even principle and generating profit since the implementation of FFP, the overall picture of 
financial health as measured by Altman's Z-score for clubs in this paper paints a more negative 
picture. Furthermore, clubs in these two leagues (particularly those that move between them in a 
promotion and relegation context) effectively find themselves at times conforming to two or three 
different types of FFP (as each affiliation has implemented their own version). Greater consistency 
is needed within the regulations to help clubs deliver long-term financial sustainability. This paper 
presents strong evidence through statistically significant results that there remains a problem with 
financial distress in English professional football and more needs to be done at governance level 
to secure the long-term viability of clubs. There has always been the question raised as to whether 
or not professional football clubs are 'too big to fail', and this paper has shown that this is not 
necessarily the case. The ‘big 6’ may be immune to some extent but for the rest of the clubs in the 
EPL and Championship, financial sustainability remains an issue. Therefore, it would be unwise 
of clubs and league organisers not to heed the warning signs given the precarious nature of their 
financial health and uncontrollable external market factors and economic shocks such as the global 
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Table 1 - Clubs and League Placings 
EPL Clubs EFL Championship Clubs 
Arsenal FC Birmingham City FC 
Aston Villa FC Brighton and Hove Albion FC 
Blackburn Rovers FC Bristol City 
Bolton Wanderers FC Burnley FC 
Charlton Athletic FC Cardiff City FC 
Chelsea FC Coventry City FC 
Everton FC Crystal Palace FC 
Fulham FC Derby County FC 
Liverpool FC Hull City FC 
Manchester City FC Ipswich Town FC 
Manchester United FC Leeds United FC 
Middlesbrough FC Leicester City FC 
Newcastle United FC Millwall FC 
Southampton FC Norwich City FC 
Stoke City FC Nottingham Forest FC 
Sunderland FC Preston North End FC 
Swansea City FC Queens Park Rangers FC 
Tottenham Hotspur FC Reading FC 
West Bromwich Albion FC Sheffield United FC 
West Ham United FC Sheffield Wednesday FC 
Wigan Athletic FC Watford FC 

















Table 2 - Seasonal Averages (EPL) 
£'m Rev EBIT CA CL TA TL SE Wages Z1 Z2 
2002 46.1 -3.4 13.3 38.2 77.4 67.7 9.3 27.8 -0.62 -6.27 
2003 53.0 -4.8 14.4 43. 77.4 74.4 2.6 32.2 1.23 -7.47 
2004 56.1 -5.1 16.7 43.5 93.4 87.3 7.8 34.5 0.11 -7.16 
2005 57.2 -4.2 20.0 45.5 102.0 94.1 8.4 35.2 -0.72 -8.68 
2006 62.9 -4.5 21.9 50.0 144.7 121.3 23.8 40.2 0.29 -5.23 
2007 72.3 -5.8 40.8 60.00 170.3 151.9 18.7 43.8 -0.60 -6.19 
2008 88.4 -2.4 52.9 79.8 192.3 183.2 9.4 53.8 -0.17 -4.34 
2009 93.3 -0.4 60.1 96.5 201.4 180.5 21.2 56.4 -0.11 -5.57 
2010 100.6 -15.7 80.8 107.3 224.1 196.3 27.9 61.8 -0.33 -5.59 
2002-
2010 70.0 -5.1 35.6 62.7 142.6 128.5 14.3 42.9 -0.10 -6.28 
2011 104.0 -12.4 75.7 127.4 224.3 210.3 13.6 70.4 -0.61 -7.31 
2012 106.5 -8.2 75.5 117.8 225.9 209.6 14.5 73.0 -0.25 -5.74 
2013 116.0 -10.3 83.5 95.4 238.3 326.0 54.6 78.4 -0.31 -5.74 
2014 143.8 7.0 98.5 104.6 268.2 187.5 67.7 82.9 -0.05 -6.28 
2015 145.0 3.7 107.4 114.8 295.4 201.6 93.7 86.9 -0.03 -4.33 
2016 155.1 -3.1 120.6 150.4 325.1 246.8 78.3 93.2 -0.52 -6.96 
2017 187.8 28.1 136.5 160.6 365. 261.2 104.2 105.9 1.27 -1.78 
2018 205.0 20.8 150.2 178.1 446.8 303.2 143.6 119.1 -0.60 -6.65 
2019 220.8 -10.8 142.9 192.0 488.1 330.7 157.5 132.0 -0.29 -4.68 
2011-









Table 3 - Seasonal Averages (EFL Championship) 
£'000 Rev EBIT CA CL TA TL SE Wages Z1 Z2 
2002 15.3 -3.7 5.8 16.4 25.2 32.3 -7.0 11.9 -0.51 -6.67 
2003 13.2 -5.3 4.9 18.9 20.1 33.3 -13.2 11.9 -1.51 -11.59 
2004 15.2 2.3 4.5 13.8 18.1 26.7 -8.7 10.9 -0.61 -11.56 
2005 15.0 -0.3 4.8 14.7 18.8 28.7 -9.9 10.1 -1.33 -15.27 
2006 13.6 -0.7 5.1 14.3 19.1 29.8 -10.7 10.1 -0.95 -11.21 
2007 15.2 -1.3 5.4 16.4 22.0 31.8 -9.8 11.5 -1.69 -13.40 
2008 18.1 -1.6 7.1 18.6 27.9 36.4 -8.4 13.2 -1.30 -10.05 
2009 18.1 -4.3 6.5 19.0 31.9 41.1 -9.1 15.3 -1.41 -8.77 
2010 22.9 -2.0 7.1 20.1 32.1 42.9 -10.8 16.8 -0.76 -7.23 
2002-
2010 16.3 -1.9 5.7 16.9 23.9 33.7 -9.8 12.4 -1.12 -10.64 
2011 21.6 -5.0 7.5 19.8 30.1 44.3 -14.3 17.4 -1.34 -9.24 
2012 23.9 -4.2 8.8 27.8 31.8 51.3 -19.7 19.9 -1.92 -13.95 
2013 24.8 -9.1 8.4 35.2 31.8 55.4 -24.2 23.0 -3.63 -22.34 
2014 34.4 -2.2 9.8 32.9 35.0 52.2 -18.1 26.0 -2.37 -20.01 
2015 38.0 0.8 14.5 32.9 43.4 57.2 -14.7 29.8 -3.19 -24.43 
2016 37.6 -4.6 16.7 53.5 52.2 66.5 -15.3 30.7 -2.66 37562 
2017 53.4 3.9 22.7 57.7 70.3 76.5 -9.4 38.2 -1.91 -17.74 
2018 54.0 -5.8 31.8 74.3 85.1 94.4 -9.5 45.7 -2.19 -17.51 
2019 70.9 -5.5 40.5 99.0 101.5 117.6 -16.1 55.5 -2.71 -22.00 
2011-
2019 39.8 -3.5 17.9 48.1 53.5 68.4 -15.7 31.8 -2.44 -18.58 
 
 
Table 4 - Descriptive statistics for all clubs Z1 and Z2 scores 
Number of Clubs EPL EFL 
Championship 
Total Observations 794 828 
No business risk 48 50 
Monitoring and analysis recommended 87 91 
High risk of bankruptcy 659 687 
Percentage of observations at high risk 83% 83% 
 
 
Table 5 – Club Averages £’000 (EPL) 2011-2018 
 
Club Rev EBIT CA CL TA TL SE Wages Z1 Z2 
Arsenal 264679 32527 228761 186933 706385 637360 220192 133185 0.98 1.99 
Aston Villa 73169 -20969 58797 144311 67836 146539 -78702 8798 -1.28 -13.49 
Blackburn 37322 -9789 8270 55119 57733 75232 -17500 34359 -1.08 -9.49 
Bolton 39386 3271 8365 63761 57546 125262 -67716 30731 -0.60 -9.31 
Charlton 20816 -3064 5614 15358 42926 57149 -14222 17418 -0.28 -3.32 
Chelsea 246073 -42774 102801 170118 470579 276092 194487 167180 0.75 0.41 
Everton 94329 -3767 30738 65701 104373 101825 2548 65076 0.54 -4.09 
Fulham 56672 -15881 12171 38197 35554 139404 -105377 46806 -4.23 -24.39 
Liverpool 219700 8702 72189 179368 291035 238819 52217 131788 0.74 -1.81 
Man City 214851 -31771 132539 254696 542727 345811 196892 140023 0.30 -1.76 
Man Utd 322492 32104 553216 234986 1267150 676602 590548 159105 1.15 3.22 
Middlesbrough 43141 -8533 15984 77067 77228 126871 -50227 32913 -1.20 -8.42 
Newcastle 102984 4238 37841 81106 168902 178805 -11571 64165 0.36 -2.23 
Southampton 65356 2854 33253 47750 91839 72089 19751 45989 0.26 -3.47 
Stoke 56140 -5164 27639 63873 55288 69054 -13771 40358 -0.08 -5.45 
Sunderland 65675 -12498 23796 73897 75396 113566 -38170 47610 -0.65 -7.74 
Swansea 50321 1706 14766 26857 38336 32430 5906 48747 2.71 -9.95 
Tottenham 165705 33189 79688 134012 423662 303309 120353 80251 1.04 0.82 
West Brom 59831 4233 23656 34448 59641 40345 19295 41122 1.43 0.38 
West Ham 89176 -1562 28271 111786 126381 163217 -36836 59134 -0.08 -5.29 













Table 6 – Club Averages £’000 (EFL Championship) 2011-2018 
 
 
Club Rev EBIT CA CL TA TL SE Wages Z1 Z2 
Birmingham 32125 -4403 12878 39271 38411 51253 -12842 25382 -0.35 -6.48 
Brighton 26597 -6483 7700 47830 20758 66198 -45440 20172 -8.46 -48.77 
Bristol City 11291 -6445 4665 20378 27786 34995 -7184 12785 -1.22 -6.75 
Burnley 39851 5313 16214 19690 31551 22894 8657 24656 0.64 -4.60 
Cardiff City 27144 -7483 7048 46772 50335 81371 -31036 25647 -1.77 -10.40 
Coventry City 9207 -3698 2976 29569 6920 42557 -35586 8287 -21.45 -131.60 
Crystal Palace 56371 -625 16654 40900 53447 49727 3782 41858 0.25 -4.60 
Derby County 22490 -5443 13378 32205 68895 50143 18752 19697 0.00 -2.99 
Hull  33137 1303 14035 51272 25799 52463 -26665 23706 -1.46 -17.55 
Ipswich 16871 -4295 7133 16395 30235 67078 -36827 15845 -1.35 -8.18 
Leeds United 34401 -3809 16906 32762 39025 48229 -9175 25245 0.64 -4.18 
Leicester City 64444 1917 29664 57752 105826 77016 28810 45581 0.24 -2.60 
Millwall 9754 -3572 2251 23915 18194 65052 -46858 9317 -3.49 -18.59 
Norwich 42711 840 19261 32931 61424 45993 13930 30901 0.84 -0.34 
Notts Forest 14427 -6582 3671 35765 14215 55872 -41662 17919 -5.37 -30.57 
Preston 8988 -3667 3241 16316 31142 31080 -314 9374 -0.18 -2.89 
QPR 36325 -613 8995 9553 19318 11191 8127 26642 3.36 6.19 
Reading 25941 -4299 8945 39284 42536 59967 -19791 24399 -0.75 -7.13 
Sheff Utd 15221 -1870 12002 22727 32390 48302 -15912 14231 -0.12 -5.62 
Sheff Weds 14213 -2345 6019 27370 32866 43911 -11044 12698 -0.74 -7.39 
Watford 38849 236 11417 32250 49663 53422 -8356 26009 0.04 -5.52 




Table 7: ‘Big Five’ European league clubs’ profitability 2009/10 – 2018/19 (€m) 
Year 09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17 17/18 18/19 
England 103 81 104 96 739 721 681 1,208 979 934 
Spain - - - - 347 260 397 455 226 445 
Germany 138 171 190 264 250 316 284 343 373 394 
Italy (110) (149) (160) (53) (143) (133) (40) 30 59 (36) 
France (102) (97) (67) (3) (140) (35) (98) (43) (298) (306) 
Source: Adapted from Deloitte (2020) 
 
Table 8: Z2 scores for ‘Big 6’ clubs in comparison to the rest post FFP 
Date 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Average of Z2 scores for 





1.25 2.49 3.18 2.27 2.42 2.72 2.00 
Average of Z2 scores for 





















.77 .35 .71 .54 .63 .51 .75 .68 .56 
Correlation Z2/revenue 
rest of the EPL 
-.03 -.16 -.28 .19 .40 .50 .72 .36 .50 
 
Table 9: Z2 scores for ‘Big 6’ clubs in comparison to the rest pre FFP 
Date 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average of Z2 scores for 





-.79 -.51 .06 -.06 -.42 -.13 -.68 
Average of Z2 scores for 





















.80 .66 .01 -.02 .42 .35 .63 .68 .72 
Correlation Z2/revenue 
rest of the EPL 
.41 .41 .25 0.19 -.02 -.25 .1 -.13 -.58 
 
 
